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Abstract—Wireless communication provides a wide coverage
at the cost of exposing information to unintended users. As
an information-theoretic paradigm, secrecy rate derives bounds
for secure transmission when the channel to the eavesdropper
is known. However, such bounds are shown to be restrictive
in practice and may require exploitation of specialized coding
schemes. In this paper, we employ the concept of directional
modulation and follow a signal processing approach to enhance
the security of multi-user MIMO communication systems when
a multi-antenna eavesdropper is present. Enhancing the security
is accomplished by increasing the symbol error rate at the eaves-
dropper. Unlike the information-theoretic secrecy rate paradigm,
we assume that the legitimate transmitter is not aware of its
channel to the eavesdropper, which is a more realistic assumption.
We examine the applicability of MIMO receiving algorithms at
the eavesdropper. Using the channel knowledge and the intended
symbols for the users, we design security enhancing symbol-level
precoders for different transmitter and eavesdropper antenna
configurations. We transform each design problem to a lin-
early constrained quadratic program and propose two solutions,
namely the iterative algorithm and one based on non-negative
least squares, at each scenario for a computationally-efficient
modulation. Simulation results verify the analysis and show that
the designed precoders outperform the benchmark scheme in
terms of both power efficiency and security enhancement.
Keywords—Array processing, directional modulation, M -PSK
modulation, physical layer security, symbol-level precoding.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
Wireless communications allows information flow through
broadcasting; however, unintended receivers may also receive
these information, with eavesdroppers amongst them. To de-
rive a bound for secure transmission, Wyner proposed the
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secrecy rate concept in his seminal paper [2] for discrete
memoryless channels. The secrecy rate defines the bound for
secure transmission and proper coding is being developed
to achieve this bound [3]. However, the secrecy rate can
restrict the communication system in some aspects. Primarily,
the secrecy rate requires perfect or statistical knowledge of
the eavesdropper’s channel state information (CSI) [2], [4]–
[6], however, it may not be possible to acquire the perfect
or statistical CSI of a passive eavesdropper in practice. In
addition, in the secrecy rate approach, the transmission rate
has to be lower than the achievable rate, which may conflict
with the increasing rate demands in wireless communications.
Furthermore, the transmit signal usually is required to follow
a Gaussian distribution which is not the case in current digital
communication systems.
Recently, there has been a growing research interest on
directional modulation technology and its security enhancing
ability. As a pioneer, [7] implements a directional modulation
transmitter using parasitic antenna. This system creates the
desired amplitude and phase in a specific direction by varying
the length of the reflector antennas for each symbol while
scrambling the symbols in other directions. The authors of [8]
suggest using a phased array at the transmitter and employ
the genetic algorithm to derive the phase values of a phased
array in order to create symbols in a specific direction. The
directional modulation concept is later extended to direction-
ally modulating symbols to more than one destination. In [9],
the singular value decomposition (SVD) is used to direction-
ally modulate symbols in a two user system. The authors
of [10] derive the array weights to create two orthogonal
far field patterns to directionally modulate two symbols to
two different locations and [11] uses least-norm to derive
the array weights and directionally modulate symbols towards
multiple destinations in a multi-user multi-input multi-output
(MIMO) system. The authors in [1] design the array weights
of a directional modulation transmitter in a MIMO system to
minimize the power consumption while keeping the signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) of each received signal above a specific
level. The directional modulation literature focuses on practical
implementation and the security enhancing characteristics of
this technology. On top of the works in the directional modu-
lation literature where antennas excitation weights change on
a symbol basis, the symbol-level precoding to create construc-
tive interference between the transmitted symbols has been
developed in [12]–[16] by focusing on the digital processing
of the signal before being fed to the antenna array. The main
2difference between the directional modulation and the digital
symbol-level precoding for constructive interference is that
the former focuses on applying array weights in the analog
domain such that the received signals on the receiving antennas
have the desired amplitude and phase, whereas the latter
uses symbol-level precoding for digital signal design at the
transmitter to create constructive interference at the receiver.
Furthermore, directional modulation was originally motivated
by physical layer security, whereas symbol-level precoding by
energy efficiency.
B. Contributions
In this paper, we study and design the optimal precoder
for a directional modulation transmitter in order to enhance
the security in a quasi-static fading MIMO channel where
a multi-antenna eavesdropper is present. Here, enhancing the
security means increasing the symbol error rate (SER) at the
eavesdropper. In directional modulation, users’ MIMO channel
and symbols meant for the users are used to design the
precoder. The precoder is designed to induce the symbols on
the receiver antennas rather than generating the symbols at
the transmitter and sending them, which is the case in the
conventional transmit precoding [17], [18]. In other words,
in the directional modulation, the modulation happens in the
radio frequency (RF) level while the arrays’ emitted signals
pass through the wireless channel. This way, we simulta-
neously communicate multiple interference-free symbols to
multiple users. Also, the precoder is designed such that the
receiver antennas can directly recover the symbols without
CSI knowledge and equalization. Therefore, assuming the
eavesdropper has a different channel compared to the users, it
receives scrambled symbols. In fact, the channels between the
transmitter and users act as secret keys [19] in the directional
modulation. Furthermore, since the precoder depends on the
symbols, the eavesdropper cannot calculate it. In contrast to
the information theoretic secrecy rate paradigm, the directional
modulation enhances the security by considering more practi-
cal assumptions. Particularly, directional modulation does not
require the eavesdropper’s CSI to enhance the security; in
addition, it does not reduce the transmission rate and signals
are allowed to follow a non-Gaussian distribution. In light of
the above, our contributions in this paper can be summarized
as follows:
1) We design the optimal symbol-level precoder for a
security enhancing directional modulation transmitter
in a MIMO fading channel to communicate with ar-
bitrary number of users through symbol streams. In
addition, we derive the necessary condition for the
existence of the precoder, which is novel compared to
the digital symbol-level precoding works in [12]–[16].
The directional modulation literature mostly includes
LoS analysis with one or limited number of users, and
multi-user works do not design the optimal precoder
to communicate symbols with arbitrary multi-antenna
users from a power efficiency point of view.
2) We analyze the applicability of various MIMO receiv-
ing algorithms at the eavesdropper. Since the imposed
SER on the eavesdropper depends on the difference
between the number of transmitter and the eavesdropper
antennas, we consider the cases when the eavesdropper
has less or more antennas than the transmitter and
design a specific precoder for each case. We mini-
mize the transmission power for the former case and
maximize the SER at the eavesdropper for the latter
case to prevent or suppress successful decoding at the
eavesdropper. This is done while keeping the SNR of
users’ received signals above a predefined threshold
and thus the users’ rate demands are satisfied. The
analysis of different MIMO receiving algorithms at the
eavesdropper and designing a precoder to maximize the
SER at the eavesdropper are absent in the available
directional modulation literature and digital symbol-
level precoding works [12]–[16].
3) We show that the SER imposed on the eavesdropper in
the conventional precoding depends on the difference
between the number of antennas of the eavesdropper
and the receiver. In our design, the SER imposed on
the eavesdropper depends on the difference between
the number of eavesdropper and transmitter antennas
since the precoder depends on both the channels and
symbols. The transmitter, e.g., a base station, probably
has more antennas than the receiver, hence, it is more
likely to preserve the security in directional modulation,
especially in a massive MIMO system.
4) We simplify the power and SNR minimization precoder
design problems into a linearly-constrained quadratic
programming problem. For faster design, we introduce
new auxiliary variable to transform the constraint into
equality and propose two different ways to solve the
design problems. In the first way, we use the penalty
method to get an unconstrained problem and solve it by
proposing an iterative algorithm. Also, we prove that the
algorithm converges to the optimal point. In the second
one, we use the constraint to get a non-negative least
squares design problem. For the latter, there are already
fast techniques to solve the problem.
C. Additional Related Works to Directional Modulation
Array switching at the symbol rate is used in [20], [21] to
induce the desired symbols. In connection with [7], [22] studies
the far field area coverage of a parasitic antenna and shows that
it is a convex region. The technique of [8] is implemented
in [23] using a four element microstrip patch array where
symbols are directionally modulated for Q-PSK modulation.
The authors of [24] propose an iterative nonlinear optimization
approach to design the array weights which minimizes the dis-
tance between the desired and the directly modulated symbols
in a specific direction. The Fourier transform is used in [25],
[26] to create the optimal constellation pattern for Q-PSK di-
rectional modulation. In [9], [27]–[29] directional modulation
is employed along with noise injection. The authors of [27],
[28] utilize an orthogonal vector approach to derive the array
weights in order to directly modulate the data and inject the
artificial noise in the direction of the eavesdropper. The work
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Fig. 1. Generic architecture of a directional modulation transmitter, including
the optimal security enhancing antenna weight generator using the proposed
algorithms.
of [27] is extended to retroactive arrays1 in [29] for a multi-
path environment. An algorithm including exhaustive search is
used in [30] to adjust two-bit phase shifters for directionally
modulating information.
D. Organization
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, transmitter architectures, network configuration, and
the signal model are introduced. The security of the directional
modulation is studied in Section III. In Section IV, the optimal
precoders for the directional modulation are designed and
the benchmark scheme is mentioned. The complexity of our
scheme and the benchmark method are studied in Section V.
In Section VI, we present the simulation results. Finally, the
conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
Notation: Upper-case and lower-case bold-faced letters are
used to denote matrices and column vectors, respectively.
The superscripts (·)T , (·)∗, (·)H , and (·)† represent trans-
pose, conjugate, Hermitian, and Moore-Penrose pseudo inverse
operators, respectively. IN×N denotes an N by N identity
matrix, diag(a) denotes a diagonal matrix where the elements
of the vector a are its diagonal entries, a ◦ b is the element-
wise Hadamard product, a+ denotes a vector where negative
elements of the vector a are replaced by zero, 0 is the all
zero vector, ‖ · ‖ is the Frobenius norm, and | · | represents the
absolute value of a scalar. Re (·), Im (·), and arg (·) represent
the real valued part, imaginary valued part, and angle of a
complex number, respectively.
II. SIGNAL AND SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a communication network with a multi-antenna
transmitter denoted by T , R multi-antenna users denoted by
1A retroactive antenna can retransmit a reference signal back along the path
which it was incident despite the presence of spatial and/or temporal variations
in the propagation path.
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Fig. 2. RF signal generation using actively driven elements, including power
amplifiers and phase shifters.
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Fig. 3. RF signal generation using power amplifiers and parasitic antennas.
Ur for r = 1, ..., R where the r-th user has Nr antennas, and a
multi-antenna eavesdropper2 denoted by E with Ne antennas,
as shown in Fig. 1. In addition, all the communication channels
are considered to be quasi-static block fading. Two possible
architectures for the RF signal generator block of Fig. 1 are
presented in Figures. 2 and 3. In Fig. 2, power amplifiers and
phase shifters are used in each RF chain to adjust the gain and
the phase of the transmitted signal from each antenna. In Fig. 3,
we adapt the technique of [7] to adjust the phase using parasitic
antennas in each RF chain. A parasitic antenna is comprised
of a dipole antenna and multiple reflector antennas. Near field
interactions between the dipole and reflector antennas creates
the desired amplitude and phase in the far filed, which can
be adjusted by switching the proper MOSFETs. When using
parasitic antennas, the channel from each parasitic antenna to
the far field needs to be LoS, and we need to acquire the CSI of
the fading channel from the far field of each parasitic antenna
2The same system model and solution holds for multiple colluding single-
antenna eavesdroppers.
4to the receiving antennas. For simplicity, we only consider the
amplitude and phase of the received signals and drop ej2pift,
which is the carrier frequency part.
After applying the optimal coefficients to array elements,
the received signals by Ur and E are
yUr = HUrw + nUr , r = 1, ..., R (1)
yE = HEw + nE , (2)
where the signal yUr is an Nr × 1 vector denoting the
received signals by Ur, yE is an Ne × 1 vector denoting
the received signals by E, HUr = [h1r , ...,hnr , ...,hNr ]
T is
an Nr × Nt matrix denoting the channel from T to Ur, hnr
is an Nt × 1 vector containing the channel coefficients from
the transmitter antennas to the n-th antenna of the r-th user,
the channel for all users is an NU × Nt matrix defined as
HU = [HU1 , ...,HUr , ...,HUR ]
T , HE is an Ne × Nt matrix
denoting the channel from T to E, and w denotes the transmit
precoding vector. In directional modulation, the elements of
HUrw =
[√
γs1r , ...,
√
γsnr , ...,
√
γsNr
]T
are the induced
M -PSK symbols on the antennas of the r-th user, snr is
the induced M -PSK symbol on the n-th antenna of the r-
th user with instantaneous unit energy, i.e., |snr |2 = 1, γ
is the SNR of the induced symbol, and M is the M -PSK
modulation order. To detect the received symbols, Ur can apply
conventional detectors on each antenna. The random variables
nUr and nE denote the additive white Gaussian noise at Ur
and E, respectively. The Gaussian random variables nUr and
nE are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with
nUr ∼ CN (0, σ2nUr INr×Nr ), and nE ∼ CN (0, σ2nEINe×Ne),
respectively, where CN denotes a complex and circularly
symmetric random variable.
Throughout the paper, we assume that T knows only HU
while E knows both HU and HE . In the following, we
analyze the conditions under which we can enhance the system
security.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF DIRECTIONAL MODULATION
In this section, we discuss different MIMO receiving algo-
rithms and investigate whether E can use them to estimate
the received signals by the users or not. We assume that
E’s channel is independent from those of the users, and to
consider the worst case, we assume that HE is full rank.
Hence, the element numbers of HEw, i.e., received signals on
E’s antennas, are different from those of HUrw, i.e., received
signals on receiver antennas, for r = 1, ..., R. Since w depends
on the symbols, E cannot directly calculate it. In the following,
we analyze the capability of E in using MIMO receiving
algorithms to estimate w.
A. Zero-Forcing Estimation
As an approach to estimate w, E can remove HE through
zero-forcing (ZF) estimation, and then multiply the estimated
w by HU to estimate the symbols. For Ne < Nt, E cannot
estimate HUw since H
†
EHE 6= I. However, when Ne ≥ Nt,
E can estimate w as follows
ŵ = G1yE = w +G1nE , (3)
where
G1 =
(
HHEHE
)−1
HHE , (4)
and ŵ is the estimated w at E. Next, E can multiply ŵ by
HU to estimate the signals at receiver antennas, HU ŵ, as
HU ŵ = HUw +HU
(
HHEHE
)−1
HHEnE . (5)
Through (3) to (5), E virtually puts itself in the location of the
users to estimate the received signal by them. The eavesdropper
is capable of doing this since we assume that it knows the
users’ channels, HU . This way, E gets access to the secret
key, which allows for observing the signals from users’ point
of view; however, the required process increases the noise at
E.
B. Minimum Mean-Square Error Estimation
To avoid enhanced noise, E can estimate w via the min-
imum mean-square error (MMSE) technique. The estimated
symbols at E through MMSE can be written as [31]
ŵ = G2yE , (6)
HU ŵ = HUG2HEw +HUG2nE , (7)
with
G2 =
(
HHEC
−1
w HE +C
−1
NE
)−1
HHEC
−1
w , (8)
where CW is the covariance matrix of the precoding vector,
w, and CNE is the covariance matrix of the eavesdropper
noise, nE . As we see in (8), the MMSE estimation of w at the
eavesdropper requires the knowledge of CW. As an approach
to derive CW, the eavesdropper can design w for different ran-
dom sequences of s and channel realizations to derive multi-
ple instantaneous covariance matrices as (w −w) (w −w)H ,
where w is the average of w. Then, E can average over
these instantaneous covariance matrices to calculate CW. The
eavesdropper can apply the MMSE estimation approach as
long as the matrix HHEC
−1
w HE +C
−1
NE
is non-singular.
C. Successive Interference Cancellation and Sphere Decoding
The observed signal by the eavesdropper in a conventional
MIMO system is
yE = HEWs+ nE, (9)
where the precoding vector W depends only on the channel.
The eavesdropper needs to estimate the symbol vector, s,
in (9) where its elements are drawn from a finite-alphabet set.
When the successive interference cancellation (SIC) receiver
is applied to a conventional MIMO receiver, each element of
s is detected and reduced from the aggregated signal. This
is possible since s is drawn from a finite-alphabet set [32].
However, in our case, the eavesdropper needs to estimate the
precoding vector w whose elements take continuous values.
5Hence, the successive interference cancellation techniques,
e.g., ZF-SIC and MMSE-SIC, cannot be applied at the eaves-
dropper. Furthermore, the similar argument can be followed
for the sphere decoding technique [33], which is based on
creating a sphere around the received symbol and finding the
closet member of the finite-alphabet set to it.
Note that E needs to estimate w whether it wants to estimate
the symbols of a specific user or all the users.
We will see in Section VI that as the difference between Nt
ad Ne goes higher, the imposed SER at E for both ZF and
MMSE estimators increases.
Remark 1: Using a large-scale array transmitter, it is more
probable to have a higher difference between Nt and Ne.
Hence, the directional modulation technique seems to be a
good candidate to enhance the security when the transmitter
is equipped with a large-scale array. 
D. Brute-force and maximum likelihood Approach
Apart from the previous estimation approaches, the eaves-
dropper can follow the brute-force approach and consider all
the possible symbol combinations. For a specific modulation
order and total number of users’ antenna, the symbol vec-
tor, s, has MNU different possibilities. This means that the
eavesdropper needs to solve the design problems (13), (35),
or (39) MNU times to make a look up table. Furthermore, note
that the eavesdropper needs to recalculate the entire look up
table if any element in HU or HE changes. Depending on the
coherence time of the channel, this increases the computational
complexity at the eavesdropper. If we assume the ideal case
without noise, the eavesdropper needs to search in its look up
table for yE to find the corresponding vector w.
Nevertheless, we have noise in practice. This requires E
to compare its received signal with all the computed MNU
possible cases of yE to find the corresponding precoding
vector w. As we see, the possibilities increase exponentially
with M and NU . If we show the calculated possible cases of
w as the set w = {w1, ...,wMNU } where the cardinality of w
is MNU , the eavesdropper can follow the maximum likelihood
approach to find w as
wˆ = arg min
wi∈w
‖yE −HEwi‖2 , (10)
where wˆ is the brute-force solution. The complexity of cal-
culating the norm of the difference of two vectors with the
length Ne is
cnorm = 2NeO (n) +Ne
(
2O
(
n1.465
)
+O (n)
)
+NeO (n)
= 4NeO(n) + 2NeO
(
n1.465
)
. (11)
Considering that the eavesdropper needs to try all the elements
of the set w, the total complexity of the brute-force approach
is given by cbrute−froce = MNU (cnorm + cdesign), where
cdesign is the complexity of solving (25), (37), or (47), which
is quantitatively mentioned in (53) and (54). The brute-force
complexity increases exponentially both in modulation order
and total number of receiving antennas. To further understand
the amount of computational complexity of the brute-force
method, we compare it with the advanced encryption security
(AES) method in the following example. For M = 32
and NU = 52, the computational complexity of the brute-
force method is 2260(cnorm + cdesign). The complexity of the
improved biclique attack to break the largest key of the AES,
which has 256 bit size, is 2254.27 [34], which is significantly
lower than the complexity of the brute-force method at the
eavesdropper for the mentioned example. Computation time
of the brute-force method with respect to system dimension is
presented in Section VI.
According to this section, we see that the optimal strategy
at E is the brute-force and maximum likelihood approaches.
However, we see that this comes with an extremely large
computational cost.
Remark 2: Assuming that the legitimate channel is recipro-
cal, the users can transmit pilots to T so it can estimate HU .
This way, we avoid the additional downlink channel estimation
and the users do not have to send feedback bits to T , hence,
E cannot estimate HU . Assuming that E knows the channel
from T to itself, i.e., HE , it can estimate w as in (3) or (6),
but it cannot perform (5) or (7) to estimate the received signals
on the receiver antennas. 
In the next section, optimal symbol-level precoders for the
directional modulation are designed to enhance the security.
IV. OPTIMAL PRECODER DESIGN FOR DIRECTIONAL
MODULATION
In this section, we define the underlaying problems to
design the security enhancing symbol-level precoder for the
directional modulation. Since the SER at E depends on the
difference between Nt and Ne, we consider the cases Ne < Nt
and Ne ≥ Nt and design a specific precoder for each of them.
The case Ne < Nt focuses on energy efficiency, hence, we
also perform relaxed phase analysis for this case.
A. The Case of Strong Transmitter (Ne < Nt, Fixed Phase)
In wireless transmission, adaptive coding and modulation
(ACM) is used to enhance the link performance and the
channel capacity. In ACM, the transmission power, coding rate,
and the modulation order is set according to the channel signal
to noise ratio (SNR) [35]. Based on this, we preserve the SNR
of the induced symbol on the receiver antenna above or equal
to a specific level to successfully decode it. Here, we only
focus on the SNR of an uncoded signal since considering SNR
of a coded transmission based on ACM is beyond the scope
of this paper.
To avoid a non-convex design problem, we use the required
signal properties at the receiver to formulate a convex design
problem. In our design, a specific fixed phase is required for
the received signal at each receiver antenna. Since the phase
of the received signal at each receiving antenna, hTnrw, is
the same as the phase of the intended symbol, snr , if the
required SNR, γ, of the received signal increases, the in-
phase, Re
(
hTnrw
)
, and quadrature-phase, Im
(
hTnrw
)
, parts
will increase in the same proportion to satisfy the required
SNR. Since the received signal by each antenna is complex
valued, we separately consider amplitudes of the in-phase and
6quadrature-phase parts of the received signal on the receiver
antenna instead of its power. If we show the real and imaginary
valued parts of snr as Re (snr ) and Im (snr ), the required in-
phase and quadrature-phase thresholds of the received signal
are defined as
√
γRe (snr ) ,
√
γIm (snr ) . (12)
Since |snr |2 = 1, we can see that γ = γRe2 (snr ) +
γIm2 (snr ), which satisfies the SNR constraint.
We design the directional modulation precoder to minimize
the total transmit power such that 1) the signals received by
the n-th antenna of the r-th user result in a phase equal to
that of snr , and 2) the signals received by the n-th antenna
of the r-th user create in-phase and quadrature-phase signal
levels satisfying the thresholds defined in (12). Accordingly,
the precoder design problem is defined as
min
w
‖w‖2
s.t. arg
(
hTnrw
)
= arg (snr ) , (13a)
Re
(
hTnrw
) ≥ √γRe (snr ) , (13b)
for r = 1, ..., R and n = 1, ..., N . Since the phase of the
induced symbol is fixed, we just need to put the signal level
constraint over the real or imaginary part of the received
signal on each receiving antenna. Hence, we have included the
constraint over the value of the real part in (13b). Generally,
some constraints of (13) are satisfied with inequality and the
rest are satisfied with equality [36]. This depends on the
difference between Nt and NU . We will also show this through
simulations in Section VI. In the case that each user is associate
with a precoder, i.e., the transmitter designs w1,..., wK for K
users, the constraints are satisfied with equality at the optimal
point [37]. If both sides of (13b) are negative, the signal
level constraints may not be satisfied. Since (13a) holds at
the optimal point, Re
(
hTnrw
)
has the same sign as Re (snr )
at the optimal point. Therefore, we can multiply both sides
of (13b) by Re(snr ) to get
min
w
‖w‖2
s.t. arg
(
hTnrw
)
= arg (snr ) , (14a)
Re (snr ) Re
(
hTnrw
) ≥ √γRe2 (snr ) . (14b)
To simplify (14), we can rewrite the phase constraint in (14a)
as
Re
(
hTnrw
)
αnr − Im
(
hTnrw
)
= 0, ∀n, ∀ r, (15)
where αnr = tan (snr ). Since tan(·) repeats after a pi radian
period3, symbols with different phases can have the same tan
value, e.g., tan
(
pi
4
)
= tan
(
3pi
4
)
. Therefore, replacing (14a)
with (15) creates ambiguity. To avoid this, we can add the
constraint
Re (snr ) Re
(
hTnrw
) ≥ 0, (16)
3If the phase of the M -PSK constellation falls on the points where tan
function is undefined, e.g., pi
2
, we can add phase offset to the modulation.
to the design problem (14) to avoid ambiguity. Interestingly,
constraint (16) is already present in (14b). Note that (15)
and (16) together are equivalent to (13a), so the required
conditions to go from (13) to (14) still hold. Putting together
the constraints (15) and (14b) for all the users, (14) is written
into the following compact form
min
w
‖w‖2
s.t. ARe (HUw)− Im (HUw) = 0, (17a)
Re (S) Re (HUw) ≥ √γ sr, (17b)
where S = diag (s), s is an NU × 1 vector containing all
the intended M -PSK symbols for the users with NU =∑R
r=1Nr, sr = Re (s) ◦ Re (s), A = diag (α), α =
[α11 , ..., αnr , ..., αNR ]
T .
To remove the real and imaginary valued parts from (17),
we can use HU = Re (HU ) + iIm (HU ) and w = Re (w) +
iIm (w) presentations to separate the real and imaginary
valued components of HUw as
HUw =Re (HU ) Re (w)− Im (HU ) Im (w)
+ i [Re (HU ) Im (w) + Im (HU ) Re (w)] , (18)
which leads into the following expressions
Re (HUw) = HU1w˜, Im (HUw) = HU2w˜, (19)
where w˜ =
[
Re
(
wT
)
, Im
(
wT
)]T
, HU1 =
[Re (HU ) ,−Im (HU)], and HU2 = [Im (HU) ,Re (HU)].
Also, it is easy to see that ‖w˜‖2 = ‖w‖2.
Using the equivalents of Re (HUw) and Im (HUw) derived
in (19), (17) transforms into
min
w˜
‖w˜‖2
s.t. (AHU1 −HU2) w˜ = 0, (20a)
Re (S)HU1w˜ ≥
√
γ sr. (20b)
Proposition 1: A necessary condition for the existence of
the optimal precoder for the directional modulation is Nt > r
′
2
where r
′
is the rank of AHU1 −HU2 . If AHU1 −HU2 is full
rank, the necessary condition becomes Nt > NU2 , which means
that the number of transmit antennas needs to be more than
half of the total number of receiver antennas.
Proof: Constraint (20a) shows that w˜ should lie in
the null space of the matrix AHU1 −HU2 . If the SVD of
AHU1 −HU2 is shown by UΣVH , the orthonormal basis for
the null space of AHU1 −HU2 are the last 2Nt− r
′
columns
of the matrix V with r
′
being the rank of AHU1 −HU2 [38].
If AHU1 −HU2 is full rank, we have r
′
= NU . For (20) to be
feasible, the mentioned null space should exist, meaning that
2Nt − r′ > 0.
Provided that the necessary condition of Proposition 1 is met, a
sufficient condition can be proposed from a geometrical point
of view; namely that the feasible set of (20) is not empty. This
holds if and only if the intersection of the linear spaces in the
constraint set constitutes a non-empty set.
7According to Proposition 1, the null space of AHU1 −HU2
spans w˜ as w˜ = Eλ where
E =
[
vr′+1, ...,v2Nt
]
, λ =
[
λ1, ..., λ2Nt−r′
]
. (21)
By replacing w˜ with Eλ, (20) boils down into
min
λ
‖λ‖2
s.t. Re (S)HU1Eλ ≥
√
γ sr, (22)
Problem4 (22) is a convex linearly constrained quadratic pro-
gramming problem and can be solved efficiently using standard
convex optimization techniques. The design problem (22)
needs to be solved once for each set of the symbols, sT .
Using optimization packages such as CVX to solve (22) can
be time consuming, hence, we propose two other approaches
to solve (22).
1) Iterative solution: In this part, we propose an iterative
approach to solve (22). To do so, first, we define a real
valued auxiliary vector denoted by u to change the inequality
constraint of (22) into equality as
min
λ,u
‖λ‖2
s.t. Bλ =
√
γsr + u, u ≥ 0. (23)
where B = Re (S)HU1E. Using the penalty method [39], we
can write (23) as an unconstrained optimization problem
min
λ,u≥0
‖λ‖2 + η‖Bλ− (√γsr + u)‖2, (24)
which is equivalent to (23) when η → ∞. We can solve (24)
using an iterative approach by first optimizing u and consider-
ing λ to be fixed, and then optimizing u and considering λ to
be fixed. In the following, we mention these two optimization
problems and their closed-form solutions.
When optimizing over u and keeping λ fixed, the optimiza-
tion problem to be solved can be written as
min
u≥0
‖u− (Bλ−√γsr)‖2. (25)
The closed-form solution of (25) is given in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1: The closed-form solution of (25) is u? =(
Bλ−√γsr
)
+
.
Proof: To solve (25), we need to minimize the distance
between the vectors u and
(
Bλ−√γsr
)
. Since λ is fixed,
the elements of
(
Bλ−√γsr
)
are known. If an element of
Bλ−√γsr is nonnegative, we pick up the same value for
the corresponding element of u. If an element of Bλ−√γsr
is negative, we pick up zero for the corresponding element of
u since u ≥ 0. This is equivalent to picking up u as
u? = (Bλ−√γsr)+. (26)
4The design problem (22) can be extended to M-QAM modulation [14] by
changing the constraint into equality. A detailed derivation falls beyond the
scope of this paper.
Algorithm 1 Iterative approach to solve (24)
1: Pick up λn ∈ IR2Nt and η ∈ (0,∞];
2: Substitute λn in (26) to get un;
3: Substitute un in (29) to get λn+1;
4: if ‖λn − λn+1‖ ≥  then
5: n = n+ 1;
6: Go to 2;
7: end if
When optimizing over λ and keeping u fixed, the optimization
problem is
min
λ
‖λ‖2 + η‖Bλ− (√γsr + u)‖2. (27)
The closed-form solution of (27) is given in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2: The closed-form solution of (27) is λ? =(
I
η +B
TB
)−1
BT (a+ u).
Proof: First, we expand (27) as
f (λ) =‖λ‖2 + η‖Bλ− (√γsr + u)‖2
=λT
(
I+ ηBTB
)
λ− 2ηλT (BT γsr +BTu)
+ η(
√
γsr + u)
T
(
√
γsr + u) . (28)
Taking the derivative of f (λ) with respect to λ yields
λ? =
(
I
η
+BTB
)−1
BT (a+ u) . (29)
Since BTB is positive semidefinite, addition of Iη to B
TB
for η 6=∞ leads into diagonal loading of BTB, which makes
I
η +B
TB invertible.
Using the closed-form solutions mentioned in Lemmas 1 and 2,
we propose Algorithm 1 to solve (24), where the matrix
inversion in (29) needs to be calculated once per symbol
transmission.
Lemma 3: Algorithm 1 monotonically converges to the op-
timal point.
Proof: Let’s denote the objective function in (24) by
f (λ,u). Assume λ0 and u0 are initial values of f (λ,u).
Using λ0 in Algorithm 1 gives us u? and λ? from (26)
and (29), respectively, which results in
f (λ?,u?) ≤ f (λ0,u?) ≤ f (λ0,u0) . (30)
Since fixing λ, (25), or u, (27), leads into a convex function,
each iteration in Algorithm 1 monotonically gets closer to the
optimal point. This along with the fact that f (λ,u) is lower
bounded at zero, guarantees the convergence of Algorithm 1
to the optimal point.
2) Non-negative least squares: We can derive λ using the
constraint of (23) as
λ = B† (
√
γsr + u) . (31)
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Fig. 4. Relaxed phase characterization of directional modulation design for
symbol s0 from M -PSK modulation.
Replacing the λ derived in (31) back into the objective of (23)
yields
min
u
∥∥B†u+ √γB†sr∥∥2
s.t. u ≥ 0, (32)
which is a non-negative least squares optimization problem.
Since B† and
√
γB†sr are real valued, we can use the method
of [40] or its fast version [41] to solve (32). We analyze the
computational complexity of the non-negative least squares in
Section V and mention its computational time in Section VI.
Similar to Section IV-A1, B† needs to be calculated once per
symbol transmission.
B. The Case of Strong Transmitter (Ne < Nt, Relaxed Phase)
The phases of the received signals in (13) are fixed, which
decreases the degrees of freedom in designing w, and conse-
quently the power efficiency. To improve the power efficiency
in the transmitter side, we can consider a region instead of
a line for the phase of the received signal on each receiving
antenna. In the M -PSK modulation, each symbol has a de-
tection region within ± piM degrees of its phase. The detection
and relaxed phase regions for a reference symbol s0 with the
angle ϕs0 = arg(s0) are shown in Fig. 4 [42]. According to
the characterization in Fig. 4, the relaxed phase design problem
is defined as [13], [16], [42]
min
w
‖w‖2
s.t. Im
(
hTnrwe
iϕnr
) ≥ b1 Re (hTnrweiϕnr )+ a1, (33a)
Im
(
hTnrwe
iϕnr
) ≤ b2 Re (hTnrweiϕnr )+ a2, (33b)
for r = 1, ..., R and n = 1, ..., N , where
a1 = c1 −
√(
cos−2
(
ϕs0 −
pi
M
)
− 1
)
c22,
a2 = − tan
(
ϕs0 +
pi
M
)[
c2 −
√(
sin−2
(
ϕs0 +
pi
M
)
− 1
)
c21
]
,
b1 = tan
(
ϕs0 −
pi
M
)
, b2 = tan
(
ϕs0 +
pi
M
)
,
c1 =
√
γ sin (arg (s0)) , c2 =
√
γ cos (arg (s0)) , (34)
and ϕnr = arg (snr ). The value of ϕnr can be absorbed in
the channel to rewrite (33) as
min
w
‖w‖2
s.t. Im
(
h˜Tnrw
)
≥ b1 Re
(
h˜Tnrw
)
+ a1, (35a)
Im
(
h˜Tnrw
)
≤ b2 Re
(
h˜Tnrw
)
+ a2. (35b)
By stacking the constraints, we can encapsulate (35) as
min
w
‖w‖2
s.t. Im
(
H˜Uw
)
≥ b1 Re
(
H˜Uw
)
+ a11, (36a)
Im
(
H˜Uw
)
≤ b2 Re
(
H˜Uw
)
+ a21, (36b)
where 1 is an NU × 1 unit vector. We can use the relations
developed in (19) to transform (36) into
min
w
‖w‖2
s.t. B1w ≥ a, (37)
where
B1 =
[
H˜U2 − b1H˜U1
b2H˜U1 − H˜U2
]
, a =
[
a11
−a21
]
. (38)
Using a similar approach as in Section IV-A, (37) can be
efficiently solved using the proposed iterative approach or the
non-negative least squares formulation.
C. The Case of Strong Eavesdropper (Ne ≥ Nt)
In this case, as the results in Section VI show, E can get
a lower SER compared to the Ne < Nt case. This capability
of E comes from the fact that it has more antennas than T
and owns global CSI knowledge, which puts E in a superior
position compared to T from hardware and CSI knowledge
point of view. Nevertheless, there is still one possible way to
enhance the security. Focusing on the signal part and ignoring
the noise, we can see from (5), for ZF estimator, or (7), for
MMSE estimator, that wˆ = w. This means that the estimated
symbols by E are equal to those induced on receiver antennas,
HUw, for the noiseless case, therefore, we can design the
precoder such that the SNR of the received signal becomes
9equal to the required level for successful decoding, which is
defined by ACM.
As the results of the case Ne < Nt in Section VI shows,
the SNR level at E is lower than that of the users, which may
prevent successful decoding of theM -PSK symbol at E. Based
on this, we can minimize the sum power of the received signals
at the users, ‖HUw‖2, which is the same as the sum power
of the estimated signals at E. In this frame, minimizing the
sum power of the received signals is equivalent to minimizing
the power of received signal on each receiving antenna. Since
the power of the received signal on each receiving antenna is
constrained, minimizing the sum power results in the minimum
possible power on each receiving antenna. This results in a sort
of “security fairness” among the users. The precoder design
problem for the signal level minimization precoder can be
defined as
min
w
‖HUw‖2
s.t. arg
(
hTnrw
)
= arg (snr ) , (39a)
Re (snr ) Re
(
hTnrw
) ≥ √γRe2 (snr ) , (39b)
for r = 1, ..., R and n = 1, ..., N . Similar as in (13), the
phase of the received signal on each receiving antenna in (39)
is fixed, hence, we need to consider the signal level constraint
on the real or imaginary part of the received signal. Following
a similar procedure as in Section IV-A, (39) can be transformed
to
min
w
‖HUw‖2
s.t. ARe (HUw)− Im (HUw) = 0,
Re (S) Re (HUw) ≥ √γ sr, (40)
Using (18) to (19), we expand ‖HUw‖2 as
‖HUw‖2 = w˜THTU1HU1w˜ + w˜THTU2HU2w˜
= w˜T
(
HTU1HU1 +H
T
U2HU2
)
w˜, (41)
which along with (19) helps us convert (40) into
min
w˜
w˜T
(
HTU1HU1 +H
T
U2HU2
)
w˜
s.t. (AHU1 −HU2) w˜ = 0,
Re (S)HU1w˜ ≥
√
γ sr.
(42)
For (42) to be feasible, w˜ has to be in the null space of
AHU1 −HU2 . Hence, we can write w˜ as a linear combination
of the null space basis of AHU1 −HU2 yielding w˜ = Eλ,
where E and λ are as in (21). This way, (42) boils down to5
min
λ
λTET
(
HTU1HU1 +H
T
U2HU2
)
Eλ
s.t. Bλ ≥ √γsr, (43)
where B = Re (S)HU1E. Similar as in Section IV-A, in the
following, we propose an iterative algorithm and non-negative
least squares formulation to solve (43).
5The design problem (43) can be extended to M-QAM modulation by
changing the constraint into equality. A detailed derivation falls beyond the
scope of this paper.
1) Iterative solution: By introducing the new variable u, we
can rewrite (43) as
min
λ,u
λTET
(
HTU1HU1 +H
T
U2HU2
)
Eλ
s.t. Bλ =
√
γsr + u. (44)
We can adapt Algorithm 1 to solve (43) by replacing the
solution to λ? as
λ? =
(
ET
(
HTU1HU1 +H
T
U2
HU2
)
E
η
+BTB
)−1
BT (a+ u) ,
(45)
which is derived using a similar procedure as in Section IV-A1.
Similar as in (29), the matrix inversion in (45) needs to be
calculated only once per symbol transmission.
2) Non-negative least squares: Assuming that HU1 and HU2
are non-singular, the matrix ET
(
HTU1HU1 +H
T
U2
HU2
)
E
is positive definite, hence, its Cholesky decomposition
ET
(
HTU1HU1 +H
T
U2
HU2
)
E = LLT exists and can be used
in order to rewrite (44) as
min
λ,u
∥∥LTλ∥∥2
s.t. Bλ =
√
γsr + u. (46)
We can derive λ using the constraint of (46) as λ =
B†
(√
γsr + u
)
and replace it back into the objective of (46)
to get
min
u
∥∥LTB†u+ LTB†√γsr∥∥2
s.t. u ≥ 0, (47)
which is a non-negative least squares optimization problem.
Since LTB† and LTB†
√
γsr are real valued, we can use [40],
[41] to solve (47) in an efficient way.
D. Benchmark Scheme
We consider the ZF at the transmitter [17] as the benchmark
scheme since both our design and the benchmark scheme use
the CSI knowledge at the transmitter to design the precoder.
In the benchmark scheme, ZF precoder is applied at the
transmitter to remove the interference among the symbol
streams. The received signals at users and E in the benchmark
scheme are
yU = HUWsβ + nU, (48)
yE = HEWsβ + nE, (49)
where W = HHU
(
HUH
H
U
)−1
is the precoding vector, s
contains the symbols, and β is the amplification factor for the
symbols which acts similar as
√
γ in the directional modulation
scheme. For a fair comparison, we pick up the same values
for
√
γ and β in the simulations.
When using the benchmark, E can use ZF and MMSE as
two possible ways to estimate the symbols. In contrast to our
method E can use the knowledge of HU to calculate W in
the benchmark scheme.
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In the ZF approach, given that Ne ≥ Nt, E can estimate
sβ as
ŝβ =
[
(HEW)
H
HEW
]−1
(HEW)
H
yE
= sβ +
[
(HEW)
H
HEW
]−1
(HEW)
H
nE (50)
where ŝβ is the estimated sβ at E. Since HEW is Ne×NU ,[
(HEW)
H
HEW
]−1
(HEW)
H
HEW = I for Ne ≥ NU .
Hence, in the benchmark scheme, E can derive the pre-
coder and estimate the symbols using the ZF method when
Ne ≥ NU . On the other hand, since our designed precoder
depends on both the channels and symbols, E cannot derive
the precoder and estimate the symbols using the ZF method
when Ne ≥ NU .
In the MMSE approach, E can estimate sβ as
ŝβ = G3yE , (51)
where
G3 =
[
(HEW)
H
C−1w HEW +C
−1
NE
]−1
(HEW)
H
C−1w .
(52)
When using the benchmark method, we will see in Section VI
that SER at E when using the MMSE method depends on the
difference between Ne and NU , while the SER at E depends
on the difference between Ne and Nt in our method. Broadly
speaking, the base station has usually more antennas than the
users, hence, it is more likely to have a higher difference
between Ne and Nt rather than Ne and NU , especially with
a large-scale array. Therefore, it is more probable to preserve
the security in our design compared to the benchmark scheme.
Furthermore, by comparing (5) and (7) with (50), we see that
E has to multiply Ŵ by HU in our design whereas E does
need to do this in the benchmark scheme.
V. REMARKS ON COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
In this part, we analyze the computational complexity of
our method and the benchmark scheme assuming that we
pick up the non-negative formulation approach to design our
precoder. The computational complexity of the non-negative
least squares approach when using the interior point, (53),
and fast projected gradient algorithms, (54), are, respectively,
as [43]
O
(
N3t ln ε
−1) , (53)
O
(
λ
1
2
0 ‖w0 −w?‖N2t ε−
1
2
)
, (54)
where ε is the upper bound on the difference between the cur-
rent, f (witr), and the optimal value, f (w?), of the objective
function as f (witr) − f (w?) ≤ ε, λ0 = λmax
(
DTD
)
with
D = B† for (32), D = B†1 for (37), and D = L
TB† for (47).
Next, we derive the computational complexity of the bench-
mark scheme. Considering the structure of W, the complexity
of the benchmark scheme is derived as
2O
(
NtN
2
U
)
+O
(
N3U
)
+O (NtNU ) . (55)
Each of the problems in (32), (37), and (47), need to be
solved once per group of symbols communications. In other
words, NU symbols can be communicated for each designed
precoder. Therefore, a higher NU means that more symbols
can be communicated to the users for each designed precoder.
On the other hand, the designed precoder in the benchmark
scheme can be used as far as the channel is fixed. Hence,
the computational complexity comparison between our scheme
and the benchmark method depends on the channel changing
rate, the total number of users’ antennas, and the required
accuracy in the non-negative least squares solution in (53)
or (54).
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this part, we present different simulation scenarios to
analyze the security and the performance of the directional
modulation scheme for different precoding designs, and com-
pare them with a benchmark scheme. In all simulations,
channels are considered to be quasi static block Rayleigh
which are generated using i.i.d. complex Gaussian random
variables with distribution CN (0, 1) and remain fixed during
the interval that the M -PSK symbols are being induced at
the receiver. Also, the noise is generated using i.i.d. complex
Gaussian random variables with distribution CN (0, σ2), and
the modulation order used in all of the scenarios is 8-PSK
modulation. Here, we simulate each precoder for both strong
transmitter, Ne < Nt, and strong eavesdropper, Ne ≥ Nt,
cases. This way, we show the benefit of the power minimizer
precoder in the strong transmitter case and the signal level
minimizer precoder in the strong eavesdropper case. We use
the acronym “min” instead of minimization in the legend of the
figures. Unless otherwise mentioned, the power minimization
precoder used in the scenario is the one with fixed phase.
Here, the SER at E is derived by assuming that E decodes
the symbols of all users.
In all the experiments, the computation times of the iterative
method and non-negative least squares were considerably
lower than the computation time of CVX. For example, in
the case Nt = 20 and NU = 20, while the average required
time for the iterative method and non-negative least squares
was 173.4 and 10.5 milliseconds, respectively, the same task
was accomplished by CVX in 999.3 milliseconds.
In the first scenario, the effect of the number of transmitter
antennas, Nt, on transmitter’s consumed power and the SER
at users and E are investigated for power minimization, fixed
and relaxed phase, and signal level minimization precoders
in (13), (37), and (39), and the benchmark scheme. The average
consumed power, ‖w‖2, with respect to Nt is shown in Fig. 5
for NU = 8, 10. As Nt increases, the power consumption
of our design with power minimization precoders, fixed and
relaxed phase, converge to that of other two schemes. The
power consumed by power minimization precoders with fixed
and relaxed phase have the largest difference with the other two
schemes, almost 6 and 8 dB, for Nt = NU . We see that power
minimization precoder with relaxed phase has 2.5 dB less
power consumption compared to the power minimization pre-
coder with fixed phase. The signal level minimization precoder
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has almost the same power consumption as the benchmark
scheme for Nt = NU = 10. When the difference between Nt
and NU increases, all four schemes consume considerably less
power. When Nt is larger than NU , the degrees of freedom
of the signal level minimization design increases and the
power consumed by the signal level minimization precoder
approaches that of the power minimization precoder.
The average total SER at users and the average SER at E
with respect to Nt are presented in Figures 6 and 7 where the
eavesdropper uses ZF and MMSE to estimate the symbols.
Our designed precoders, power and signal level minimization,
cause considerably more SER at E compared to the benchmark
scheme for a long range of Nt. Furthermore, as Ne increases,
there are cases, e.g., Nt = 16, that the error caused at E
by the benchmark scheme decreases while the error caused
by our designed precoders remains almost fixed when E
uses the ZF estimator and reduces slightly when E uses the
MMSE estimator. As Fig. 8 shows, our design with signal level
minimization precoder and the benchmark scheme keep users’
signal level norm constant. This leads into a constant SNR at
E.
We see in Figures 6 and 7 that the MMSE estimator results
in a less SER at the eavesdropper compared to the ZF estimator
when the difference between Nt and NU increases. On the
other hand, for close values of Nt and NU , the MMSE ap-
proach leads into the same SER as the ZF approach. Although
the MMSE estimator reduces the SER at the eavesdropper,
the error at the eavesdropper is still much higher than the
users. For example, in Fig. 6, the SER at the eavesdropper
is 0.2 while the SER at the users is 10−3. We see in Fig. 7
that for Nt = NU = 10, the eavesdropper can reduce the
SER more in the benchmark scheme compared to our method.
Since the directional modulation with signal level minimization
imposes more error on E and consumes the same power
as the benchmark scheme, it is the preferable choice for
secure communication when Ne ≥ Nt. Comparing Fig. 5 with
Figures 6 and 7 shows that when the difference between Nt and
NU goes above a specific amount, the power and signal level
minimization precoders converge in both power consumption
and the SER at E and users.
The instantaneous power of the induced symbols to average
noise power is shown in Figures 9 and 10 for power, fixed and
relaxed phase, and signal level minimization precoders when
Ne > Nt. As we see, even with E being able to estimate the
symbols, the SNR at E is lower than the users. This shows
that the processes carried out at E to perform ZF and MMSE
estimations of w cause the SNR to be less than that of the
users. As Fig. 10 shows, the signal level minimization precoder
keeps the SNR at the users and E at the lowest possible level.
The SNR at the users is on the required threshold for decoding
while the SNR at E is much lower than that of the users and
below the required threshold for successful decoding, which
imposes the maximum SER on E.
In the second scenario, T ’s average power consumption, to-
tal average SER at the users, and average SER at E are plotted
with respect to total receiving antennas, NU . Fig. 11 shows
the average consumed power with respect to NU . Increasing
NU decreases the degrees of freedom and increases the power
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consumption. As NU approaches Nt, the difference between
the power consumed by the power minimization precoder and
the other two schemes increases.
We investigate the effect of NU on average total SER at
the users and the average SER at E in Figures 12 and 13. As
NU increases, the SNR provided by the power minimization
precoder goes more above the threshold. This reduces the
average SER at both users and E. On the other hand, regardless
of difference between Nt and NU , our design with signal
level minimization precoder always preserves the SER at E
in the maximum value. Compared to the ZF estimator, when
our precoders are used, the MMSE approach reduces the SER
at E for close values of NU and Nt. As NU approaches Nt,
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the performance of ZF and MMSE techniques get closer. As
shown in Fig. 13, the MMSE estimator at E reduces the SER
more compared to the ZF estimator when the signal level min
precoder is used. When Ne > NU , our design imposes more
SER at E compared to the benchmark scheme since Ne ≥ NU
is required for E to estimate the symbols in the benchmark
scheme. As NU approaches Nt, the SER imposed on E by the
signal level minimization precoder and the benchmark scheme
get closer.
The next scenario inspects the effect of the required SNR
for the received signals, γ, on T ’s consumed power and the
SER at users and E. Fig. 14 shows the average consumed
power with respect to γ for our design and the benchmark
scheme. The difference between the power consumed by the
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Fig. 9. Instantaneous symbol power to average noise power for power
minimization precoder with fixed and relaxed phase designs when Nt = 11,
NU = 10, Ne = 16 and γ = 15.56 dB.
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Fig. 10. Instantaneous symbol power to average noise power for signal level
minimization precoder when Nt = 11, NU = 10, Ne = 16 and γ = 15.56
dB.
power minimization precoder and the other two schemes in
low SNRs is more than that of high SNRs. The average total
SER at users and the average SER at E with respect to γ is
shown in Fig. 15. As SNR increases, the SER imposed on E by
our design becomes more than that of the benchmark scheme.
Furthermore, the performance of ZF and MMSE get closer
as the SNR increases. The difference between the average
total SER at the users for power and signal level minimization
precoders remains almost constant as γ increases. The effect
of low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes on the average total
bit error rate (BER) at the users and the average BER at E is
shown in Fig. 16 when the signal level minimization precoder
is used for the case Ne ≥ Nt.
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Fig. 11. Average consumed power with respect to NU for our designed pre-
coders and the benchmark scheme when γ = 15.56 dB, and β2 = 15.56 dB.
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Fig. 12. Average SER versus NU for our designed precoders and the
benchmark scheme when Nt = 16, Ne = 18, γ = 15.56 dB, and
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Next, similar to [8], we consider a LOS channel and use
a uniform linear array (ULA). In this scenario, five single-
antenna users are located on the circumference of a circle with
radius 4 meters in the angles 10◦, 50◦, 110◦, 260◦, 310◦. The
SER with respect to direction of transmission, θ, is shown in
Fig. 17. As we see, the SER sharply decreases to 2 × 10−3
from 0.6 in the locations that users are present.
In the last scenario, we quantify the required time at E to
perform brute-force method mentioned in Section III-D over
all the possible communicated symbols between the transmitter
and the receiver. The average brute-force time at E for the
proposed precoders using an ordinary computer is shown in
Fig. 18 for different modulation orders. As we see, increasing
the system dimension or the modulation order increases the
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Fig. 13. Average SER versus NU for our designed precoders and the
benchmark scheme when Nt = 16, Ne = 16, γ = 15.56 dB, and
β2 = 15.56 dB.
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Fig. 14. Average consumed power with respect to required SNR for our
designed precoders and the benchmark scheme when NU = 19.
brute-force consumed time enormously.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We used the directional modulation technology and followed
a signal processing approach to enhance the security over
multiuser MIMO channels in the presence of a multi-antenna
eavesdropper. We studied the feasibility of different MIMO
receiving algorithms at the eavesdropper and showed that the
eavesdropper is able to use the ZF and MMSE algorithms to
estimate the users’ symbols. The legitimate users can directly
decode the received signal via the conventional detectors, e.g.,
ML, while the results show that the usage of ZF or MMSE
causes much more SER at the eavesdropper compared to
the users. In addition, we derived the necessary condition
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Fig. 15. Average SER versus required SNR for our designed precoders and
the benchmark scheme when Nt = 15, Ne = 17 , and NU = 14.
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Fig. 16. Average BER versus required SNR for the signal level min precoder
when Nt = 10, Ne = 11, and NU = 10 with the code rate 5/6.
for the feasibility of the optimal precoder for the directional
modulation. We proposed an iterative algorithm and non-
negative least squares formulation to reduce the design time
of the optimal precoders. The results showed that in most
of the cases, our designed directional modulation precoders
impose a considerable amount of SER on the eavesdropper
compared to the conventional precoding. This is due to the
fact that our precoders depend on both the CSI knowledge and
the symbols while the conventional precoder only depends on
the CSI knowledge and the eavesdropper can calculate it. The
simulations showed that regardless of the number of antennas,
the signal level minimization precoder keeps the SER at the
eavesdropper on the maximum value, and it consumes the same
power as the power minimization precoder when the difference
between the number of transmit and receive antennas is above
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Fig. 17. Average SER versus the location in degrees the signal level min
precoder when Nt = 5 and T communicates with five single-antenna users,
i.e., N1 = N2 = N3 = N4 = N5 = 1.
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the system dimension when using the proposed precoders with different
modulation orders, Ne = Nt.
a specific value. In addition, the numerical examples showed
that both the power and signal level minimization precoders
outperform the benchmark scheme in terms of the power
consumption and/or the imposed SER at the eavesdropper.
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